Abstract
This work critically examines the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010, analysing its dual mandate of aligning India’s nuclear liability framework with international conventions while ensuring prompt victim compensation. Born from the tragic legacy of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and the inadequacy of traditional tort law, the CLNDA establishes a strict liability regime channelled exclusively to the operator. The author argues that although the Act succeeds in creating a legal “floor” of guaranteed, no-fault compensation, its inherent financial caps and restrictive supplier liability provisions (Section 17) severely compromise the principle of complete justice. This work also attempts at highlighting the tension between statutory limits and the constitutional “Right to Life” (Article 21), especially the “Absolute Liability” principle, through a comparative analysis with US and Canadian liability regimes. The “saving clause” (Section 46) is examined in detail in this paper, which argues that it is the crucial, though controversial, mechanism for protecting victims’ rights to seek unliquidated damages against all tortfeasors, including suppliers. It concludes by proposing specific reforms, including dynamic liability limits and a more precise judicial interpretation of supplier liability, to bridge the gap between guaranteed relief and complete accountability.
Keywords: Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), Nuclear Liability, Victim Compensation, Absolute Liability, Supplier Liability.
Introduction
The legislative architecture of India’s civil nuclear liability regime represents a direct consequence of historical trauma. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984 is the definitive, catastrophic catalyst, which tragically exposed the deep inadequacy of the pre-existing common law framework-specifically, traditional tort law-to deliver comprehensive and timely victim compensation following mass industrial disasters.[1] The core deficiency lay in the requirement to be discharged by the claimant in terms of the burden of proof for establishing negligence on the part of the operator, an all but impossible task in the complex, transnational context of catastrophic industrial harm. This institutional failure spurred the Indian Supreme Court to broaden the interpretation of liability, substituting the strict liability principle from Rylands v Fletcher with the more stringent absolute liability principle in the Oleum Gas Leak Case (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India), establishing a critical precedent for enterprises engaged in ultra hazardous activities.[2]
This failure was critically compounded by the jurisdictional dismissal of claims by US courts, often on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, effectively underlining the need for proactive state intervention. This experience accelerated the creation of targeted, strict liability regimes to ensure the delivery of swift and certain relief, signalling a national pivot away from a precarious fault-based system.
It is against this backdrop that the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, was enacted. The Act aimed to achieve a dual, and often inherently contradictory, purpose. First, it sought to establish a robust domestic mechanism for compensating victims of nuclear incidents, meeting the post-Bhopal mandate for guaranteed relief. The Act’s declared objective is to provide for “civil liability for nuclear damage and prompt compensation to the victims.”[3] Second, and most importantly, it aimed to bring India’s domestic nuclear liability regime into conformity with relevant international conventions, including the Paris, Vienna, and Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC), so as to enable international cooperation and encourage foreign investment in the country’s ambitious nuclear power program.[4] The move for international compliance led, however, to a domestic law that in many ways “appeared to defy conventional international practice.”[5]
The CLNDA thus represents a basic tension between the pursuit of a guaranteed no-fault statutory compensation system and the pre-existing non-negotiable goal of full and fair justice for every victim. A statutory compromise, necessary to pave the way for global trade, normally happens at the expense of limiting redress scope, a fact that resulted in extensive constitutional and policy debate inside and outside Parliament, especially on the constitutional principle of the right to life.[6]
The following paper argues that while the CLNDA has successfully created a legal floor of no-fault, guaranteed compensation for victims by way of channelling liability exclusively to the operator, it does so under section 4(4) but immediately defaults because of its inherent financial caps under section 6 and the highly restrictive provisions shielding powerful international and domestic suppliers under section 17, denying the principle of full and fair justice required to cover catastrophic losses. This structural deficiency requires-and arguably demands in itself-the robust preservation of common law remedies under the Act’s saving clause at section 46 as the only flexible route to true victim-centered and complete accountability.
[1]FOUNDATION OR, ‘Civil Liabilities for Nuclear Damages Bill 2010 – The Way Forward’ (orfonline.org) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/civil-liabilities-for-nuclear-damages-bill-2010-the-way-forward>
[2]M.C. Mehta v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 1086
[3]Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, Preamble.
[4]Faizanur Rahman, ‘Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010: A Critical Review’ (2018) Energy Law Reports 149, 150<https://docs.manupatra.in/newsline/articles/Upload/6C4C0DFE-1428-45AF-9B4A-396E2471C48D.pdf>
[5]ibid 149.
[6]Niranjan, ‘A Comparative Study of Nuclear Liability Regimes in US, Canada and India’ (2021) II HPNLU Journal of Environment & Disaster Management 67–87<https://hpnlu.ac.in/journal-level-3.aspx?ref-id=21>