Abstract
The Supreme Court’s decision in All India Judges Association v Union of India (2025) represents a significant recalibration[1] of judicial service architecture in India. The three-Judge Bench reopens long-running questions about promotional channels, eligibility criteria and suitability-testing for the subordinate judiciary. Key outcomes include restoration of the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) quota to 25% for promotion to the District Judge cadre, reduction of the qualifying years for LDCE eligibility, creation of a 10% LDCE channel for promotion from Civil Judge (Junior Division) to Senior Division, and reinstatement of a three-year minimum practice requirement for entry-level judicial recruitment calculated from provisional Bar enrolment. This comment situates the judgment within the doctrinal lineage of the AIJA trilogy and the Shetty Commission and Law Commission recommendations; assesses the legal reasoning, policy premises and institutional implications; critiques the Court’s balancing of merit, seniority and administrative practicability; and reflects on potential unintended consequences for judicial quality, morale and federal uniformity. The piece concludes that while the judgment commendably seeks incentives for merit and uniformity across States, it leaves important questions unresolvedchiefly, precise design of suitability tests, monitoring of LDCE implementation, and safeguards against gamingthat will determine whether the decision strengthens or destabilises judicial administration.
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s May 20, 2025 judgment in All India Judges Association v Union of India (hereafter the 2025 AIJA judgment) marks the latest and a consequential intervention into how India structures entry and promotion in the judicial hierarchy. The judgment revisits and modifies earlier directions in the AIJA line of cases (notably the 1991–2002–2010 corpus)[2], re-allocating quotas between direct recruits and promoted judges, revising eligibility thresholds for LDCEs, and restoring a minimum practice requirement for junior judicial recruitment. The Court frames these changes as corrective measuresto restore incentives for meritorious officers, resolve administrative difficulties experienced under prior prescriptions, and promote uniformity across High Courts and States.[3] The judgment therefore sits at the crossroad of constitutional adjudication about judicial independence and administrative lawmaking about cadre-management; it is fertile ground for critical scrutiny.
This comment offers a doctrinal and normative critique. Part I summarises the decision and its doctrinal antecedents. Part II analyses the Court’s core reasoning and policy foundations. Part III evaluates the decision’s strengths and shortcomingsfocusing on incentives and disincentives, federal implementation challenges, procedural safeguards, and the risk of instrumentalising promotion. The final part suggests reforms and clarifications that would render the judgment’s objectives operationally coherent.
Background and Doctrinal Lineage
The 2025 judgment must be read as continuation of a sustained judicial dialogue on judicial recruitment and promotion spanning the AIJA judgments, the Shetty Commission’s recommendations and Law Commission reports.[4] The Shetty Commission (First National Judicial Pay Commission, 1999) recommended a 75:25 split favouring promotion but with direct recruitment from the Bar at 25% for the Higher Judicial Service; it also endorsed institutional training and testing. The AIJA trilogy thereafter elaborated mechanics: in All India Judges Association(2002) the Court prescribed a tripartite recruitment model50% promotion via merit-cum-seniority (with suitability testing), 25% LDCE (merit), and 25% direct recruitment from the Bar. Subsequent (2010) adjustments reduced the LDCE quota from 25% to 10% because many High Courts were unable to fill the LDCE seats and unfilled vacancies impaired administration of justice. The 2025 judgment revisits these calibrations and restores LDCE quota to 25% while simultaneously lowering minimum departmental experience requirements[5] and reinstating prior practice requirements for entry-level posts.[6]
The judgment also engages the Law Commission’s historical view, 117th Report, 1986on training and practice, which had supported intensive institutional training as an alternative to bar experience for recruits; the Shetty Commission had similarly emphasised institutional training as a substitute for prior Bar years. The Supreme Court’s 2002 position had accepted such reasoning and relaxed the three-year Bar practice rule; the 2025 judgment reverses course[7] by reinstating a minimum three-year practice requirement for Civil Judge (Junior Division) recruitment while permitting fresh law graduates in exceptional and state-specified training schemes.
[1]All India Judges Association v Union of India (2025) INSC 735 (SC)
[2]All India Judges Association and Others v Union of India and Others (2002) 4 SCC 247 (SC); All India Judges Association and Others v Union of India and Others (2010) 15 SCC 170 (SC)
[3]All India Judges Association v Union of India (2025) INSC 735 (SC), paras 7–12
[4] First National Judicial Pay Commission (Shetty Commission), Report (11 November 1999); Law Commission of India, Training of Judicial Officers (117th Report, 28 November 1986)
[5]All India Judges Association v Union of India (2025) INSC 735 (SC), paras 13–20
[6] All India Judges Association v Union of India (2025) INSC 735 (SC), para 87; H M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing 2013) vol 3, 3051–3052
[7]All India Judges Association and Others v Union of India and Others (2002) 4 SCC 247 (SC), para 32; All India Judges Association v Union of India (2025) INSC 735 (SC), paras 84–86