ABSTRACT
Since its Independence in 1947, India has followed a parliamentary system of democracy anchored in the First-Past-the-Post electoral model, a system inherited from colonial constitutional design and retained for its perceived simplicity and stability. This paper undertakes a comparative doctrinal analysis of parliamentary electoral systems to examine how electoral design influences democratic representation, equality of votes, and constitutional legitimacy. Focusing on India’s FPTP system in comparison with Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional model and Ireland’s Single Transferable Vote system, the study evaluates whether India’s existing framework continues to meet the normative demands of a diverse and plural democracy.
The primary objective of the paper is to analyze the constitutional and statutory foundations of parliamentary electoral systems and to assess the structural limitations of India’s FPTP model in terms of disproportionality, wasted votes, and underrepresentation of minorities and smaller political parties. The need for reform in India arises from persistent vote seat distortions, declining representational equity, and growing concerns that FPTP inadequately reflects the popular will in a highly fragmented and heterogeneous polity.
Germany and Ireland are selected for the study because they represent two distinct yet successful alternatives to pure majoritarianism. Together, these systems provide contrasting yet instructive models of proportional representation that are compatible with parliamentary democracy. The paper concludes by advocating a reform of India’s electoral system through the introduction of a limited or hybrid proportional mechanism.
- INTRODUCTION
Elections are the foundation of constitutional democracy and represent the most immediate expression of the people’s will. As a result of elections, citizens confer legitimacy on their governments, whereby political power is checked through the consent of the citizens. However, the electoral system, which translates votes into legislative representation, determines the quality of the content of that democracy. Electoral systems, hence, are not just procedural devices; they are constitutional options that exercise influence over the forms of governance, representation, party systems, and even political culture. The comparative study of electoral systems can help jurists and policymakers understand how various institutional designs contribute to or hinder the promotion of democratic ideals such as equality of suffrage, proportionality, and inclusiveness.
Generally, electoral systems can be categorized into three systems namely, majoritarian systems, proportional representation systems, and hybrid or mixed systems. Simple and decisive as they are, majoritarian systems such as the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) in India gives the victor in a single-member constituency to the candidate who obtains the most votes. Proportional representation (e.g. Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) of Germany) systems are designed to make parties in parliament proportional to their total votes, to balance national proportional fairness with the individual mandates of individual constituencies. Multi-member Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems, such as those in Ireland, represent a preferential and proportional hybrid, where voters score candidates by preference.
The constitutional reasoning of these systems is vastly different. The FPTP system of India, which was introduced in accordance with Article 81 of the Constitution and which was implemented in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is evidence of the intention of the framers to be simple and familiar which they inherited in the Westminster model. The FPTP system is centered on territorial representation and efficiency in administration- important in a large and diverse federation. It however has over time been criticized as giving disproportional outcomes where the share of seats of the parties is usually way beyond the vote share thus the message of political equality is compromised.
Articles 38 of the Basic Law[1], along with the Federal Election Act (Bundeswahlgesetz) of Germany, created the MMP system to prevent the disintegration of the Weimar Republic, as well as the autocratic excesses that came after this period. The two-vote system, the one where a candidate in a district is put against another candidate, and the other vote where a party list is put against other party lists, is a constitutional trade-off between local responsibility and proportional justice. This balance has been strengthened by the federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on multiple occasions (2008, 2012 and 2024), by issuing landmark decisions that rectified the legislative imbalances of proportionality. Accordingly, the system of Germany does not only institutionalize proportional representation but it constitutionalizes it as a democratic right.
The STV system of Ireland, which is established by the ethos of Article 16 of Bunreacht na hEireann[2], provides another example of the path of electoral design. It aims to make the most of the voter preference, and least of the wasted vote by permitting preferences to be transferred between the candidates until every seat is occupied. In contrast to the party-based proportionality of Germany, the STV of Ireland maintains a direct connection between the voter and the candidate and still ensures proportional representation of votes in multi-member districts. The democratic legitimacy and trust of STV by the people were asserted by two referenda in 1959 and 1968 which attempted to oust the system in favor of FPTP but were overwhelmingly defeated by the people of Ireland.
Constitutional law as a comparative constitutional law point, it is essential to compare these three systems as it throws light on the interplay of the electoral system with the key tenets of constitutional law, including equality, fairness, and representation. Although the Indian Supreme Court, in some of its cases such as Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain [3]and Union of India v Association for Democratic Reforms[4] have acknowledged free and fair elections as the basic structure doctrine, it is yet to decide on the structural fairness of FPTP model itself. Contrarily, the German Constitutional Court has been proactive in determining the electoral law due to constitutional adjudication whereas the Irish judiciary has provided equality of representation by carrying out cases such as O’Donovan v Attorney-General.[5]These judicial paths highlight the joint influence of constitutional design and judicial interpretation to dictate the substantive quality of democracy.
The socio-political heterogeneity of India and the emergence of regional parties have continued to put a pressure on the representational sufficiency of the FPTP system. The problem of disproportional outcomes, such as a party with less than 40 percent of votes is able to obtain an absolute majority in parliament, undermines the democratic ideology of equality and inclusiveness.[6] In analysing such proportional models as MMP and STV, India can decide how to balance its demand to have a stable political system and its constitutional commitment to having a fair system of representation.
Therefore, it is essential to understand the distinctions among the FPTP in India, MMP in Germany, and STV in Ireland. It permits one to have a more nuanced understanding of how electoral structures are translated into governance, how legal institutions are defended or manipulated to benefit equality of suffrage, and how reform can enhance democratic legitimacy. In that sense, comparative constitutionalism turns into a device not only of criticism, but also of innovation, as it leads India to a more inclusive and representative future within the parameters of its constitutional framework. This paper will focus on the various systems of elections practiced in countries, how these systems work, and will also examine whether any alternative system to the existing parliamentary election system practiced in India can be substituted by the German or Irish system of electing a country.
[1]Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz) 1949, art 38
[2]Bunreacht nahÉireann (Constitution of Ireland 1937) as amended to 2024
[3]Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR (1975) SC 2299
[4]Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294
[5]O’Donovan v Attorney-General [1961] IR 114 (High Court, Ireland), discussed in Citizens’ Assembly, The Dáil Electoral System: Report and Recommendations (2018) https://citizensassembly.ie/wpcontent/uploads/Dail-Electoral-System.pdf accessed 11 October 2025
[6]Vivek Jadhav, ‘Outcome of First-Past-the-Post in a Diversified Society: Evidence on Disproportionality from Lok Sabha Constituencies’ (2022) Indian Public Policy Review (Working Paper) https://www.mse.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Working-Paper-219.pdf accessed 10 October 2025