A significant number of convicted offenders worldwide are unable to participate in elections due to the legal deprivation of their voting rights resulting from their criminal convictions. Many countries limit this measure to individuals who are currently incarcerated. This practice is commonly known as prisoner disenfranchisement. In theory, this practice represents a conflict between the concept of universal democratic participation and the exclusion faced by individuals who violate the most severe rules set by a community. This article explores the tension that arises when considering the conflict between the fundamental right to vote and the public’s interest in excluding prisoners from exercising that right. Some arguments have been made to support the idea that disenfranchisement is a valid practice. One argument suggests that the electorate should possess a certain level of civic virtue, which some believe prisoners lack (Manfredi, 2009). Another argument proposes that disenfranchisement serves as an additional punishment or civil sanction for serious offenders (Hampton, 1998). This article takes a different approach by examining the issue of disenfranchisement from a legal and constitutional standpoint, and then shifting to a more adaptable theoretical perspective. It also deviates from the idea that disenfranchisement needs to be justified based on electoral capacity or additional punishment.
Ramsay and López-Guerra contend that the circumstances of restricted or absent freedom in which prisoners reside are incongruous with the notion that prisoners are part of a genuine self-governed community. Therefore, individuals residing in such circumstances should be disqualified from voting in order to safeguard the integrity of the electoral system. This argument is often called the democratic case for disenfranchisement or democratic disenfranchisement. It focuses on the importance of prisoners’ democratic participation and emphasizes democracy as the value that is upheld through disenfranchisement, rather than punishment or capacity. [1]
One important implication of this distinction is that democratic disenfranchisement, being rooted in democracy, appears to be less susceptible to criticism. This suggests that disenfranchisement represents punitive forms of degradation and political exclusion (see Pettus, 2013). Ramsay and López-Guerra’s arguments are presented in the first section. They are then thoroughly analyzed in the following sections, where two significant issues that impact the foundations and outcomes of their arguments are highlighted. The second section discusses the importance of democratic conditions within prisons, while the third section highlights the limited impact of electoral coercion and manipulation on electoral integrity. Lastly, the article concludes that in a community that values inclusivity and democracy, there is little justification for disenfranchisement. This is because when disenfranchisement is based on punishment or capacity, it leads to exclusion and degradation, which goes against the principles of democracy.
[1]A different case for democratic disenfranchisement has been offered by Altman (2005) and Büllow (2016). They have focused on the justification of a community’s collective right to disenfranchise convicted criminals, instead of certain goals that are pursued by disenfranchisement as an institutional practice. They have recently been under criticism by Matt S. Whitt (2017).