Abstract
The Supreme Court’s landmark judgement in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) marks a massive moment in the evolution of Indian federalism. The judgement addressed a delicate constitutional matter that had the potential to disrupt the intricate balance of powers between the constitutional head of a state and its democratically elected government. This case involved the discretionary powers of governors under Article 200 of the constitution, the issue of pocket veto and the scope of judicial review over constitutional functionaries.
This comment aims to study the legal and constitutional dimensions of the decision by analysing it and evaluating its doctrinal consistency and its effects on democratic governance, cooperative federalism, and institutional accountability in India.
- Background
The Tamil Nadu legislative assembly from January 2020 and April 2023 passed 12 bills aimed at altering the governance structures of state universities. These involved some major changes that aimed at diminishing the discretionary role of the governor in university administration. Out of these 12 bills, eight of these bills were aimed at transferring the power of appointment of vice-chancellors from the governor to the state government. One bill involved a government nominee on the vice chancellor selection panel and another gave state government power over university inspections and inquiries. Other bills were brought to include the finance secretary in university syndicates and proposed the establishment of an Ayurveda state university.
Article 200 of the constitution states that the governor acts “as soon as possible” after the presentation of a bill. Yet despite this, Governor RN Ravi remained silent on these 12 bills for several years. The governor neither gave assent, withheld it nor returned the bill for reconsideration. His silence made the Tamil Nadu government move to the Supreme Court on 31 October 2023, arguing that the governor’s inaction has caused a constitutional breakdown.
The state’s petition stationed the governor’s inaction in four categories:
(i) failure to act on the twelve university-related bills passed between 2020 and 2023;
(ii) delays in granting sanctions for the prosecution of public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988;
(iii) inaction on 54 files concerning the premature release of prisoners; and
(iv) failure to make appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC), which under Article 316, falls within the Governor’s jurisdiction.
The supreme court following the petition issued a notice and called it a matter of serious concern the governor then for the first time withheld assent and sent 10 of the bills of reconsideration and reserved 2 for presidential consideration. On 20 November the court took notice of this fact and called this action by the governor as a reactive compliance rather than a proactive constitutional compliance. After this the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly reconvened and repassed the ten bills, invoking the constitutional mandate under Article 200 which makes it mandatory for the governor to give assent to the bills that are repassed by the assembly. Nonetheless, the governor again reserved the repassed bills for the president.
These events led to the constitutional confrontation that ultimately led the SC to deliver a judgement that redefined the limits of gubernatorial (i.e. relating to a governor) discretion in India’s federalist structure.