ABSTRACT
The Doctrine of Pleasure is a key principle in constitutional law, primarily associated with the British colonial system and later adopted in various forms by several former colonies, including India. It refers to the notion that the tenure of public officials, particularly in the context of executive and judicial appointments, is based on the “pleasure” or discretion of the sovereign or the appointing authority. In essence, this doctrine states that such officials can be dismissed at any time without cause or explanation, as their position is sustained solely by the pleasure of the ruling entity, be it a monarch, president, or prime minister.
The doctrine has its roots in English law, where the monarch held ultimate authority over government appointments, and it reflected the centralization of power within the monarchy. Under the Indian Constitution, the principle of “doctrine of pleasure” is enshrined in Article 310, which grants public servants (except those with fixed tenure or those governed by other statutes) the right to remain in office only at the “pleasure of the President” or the respective state governors.
Critics argue that the doctrine of pleasure is prone to abuse, as it offers the ruling authority vast discretionary power, often leaving public servants vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal. However, proponents defend its role in ensuring that public servants are aligned with the political objectives of the state, particularly when the government undergoes significant shifts in leadership. The doctrine’s impact on the relationship between the executive, legislature, and judiciary remains a subject of significant debate and analysis, especially in the context of balancing governmental control with the protection of individual rights and civil service autonomy.
This paper attempts to study the same by analysing several Indian case laws and comparing the work nature of doctrine in India and England
Keywords: Doctrine, Pleasure, constitution, civil servants.
Introduction
Article 310 has expressly provides that every person who is a member of the defence or civil service or all India service or holds any post connected with the defence or civil post shall hold it during the pleasure of the President or of the Governor as the case may be. This provision followed the earlier provisions in The Government of India Act 1919 in Sec 96 B and Government of India Act 1935 in Sec 240.which provides for the tenures of office of persons employed in civil capacities in India.
The ‘ pleasure doctrine· so incorporated had its origin in the Latin phrase “durante bene placito” , which meant that every servant of the State holds office during the pleasure of the Crown. A government servant could be removed from service at any time at the pleasure of the Crown, and when so done he had no right of action for wrongful dismissal and could not seek any relief before the courts.[1]
Historical background to the Doctrine of pleasure in India
The adoption of the concept of the ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’ in India can be traced to the Charter Act of 1833. Prior to it, sections 35 and 36 of the Act of 1793, provided for the removal or recall of any person holding any office, employment or commission in a civil or military capacity in the company, at the will and pleasure of His Majesty heirs or successors and the court of Directors respectively. The Statute of William the IV introduced the doctrine in India in these words[2].
Nothing in this act shall take away the powers of said court of directors to remove or dismiss any of the officers or servants of the said company, but the said court shall and may at times have full liberty to remove or dismiss away such officer or servant at their will and pleasure’.
All servants of the East India Company, civil and military, were to hold office during the pleasure of the Crown. They were subject to dismissal, without any reason being assigned for such dismissal, under section 74 of the government of India Act, 1833. In other words, the services of the company’s servants were subject to the pleasure of the Crown, if appointed by the Crown, and in other cases, subject to the pleasure of the Court of Directors. Civil servants had, therefore, no remedy against such dismissal. The position was restated by the Queen’s proclamation in November, 1858. It thus retained the power to dismiss any government servant at its absolute pleasure, by giving statutory recognition to the ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’, under section 16 of the Government of India Act, 1858. The Act did not provide any remedy to civil servant even against any arbitrary dismissal. Under the aforesaid Act, the Secretary of State for India came to exercise the power of pleasure, which hitherto was exercised by the Court of Directors. Though the Secretary of State-in-Council came to be entrusted with the power of framing rules in respect of the civil servants, they were subject to the overall power of the Crown to dismiss any employee at pleasure. The Government of India adopted a resolution on 27th July, 1879 providing that in all cases of dismissal or removal of civil servants, the charges should invariably be reduced in writing. It also provided for the examination of witnesses, as far as possible, in the presence of delinquent officials. Besides, it also provided for a right of cross examination. This was, however not to apply in respect of those persons suffering from punishment awarded by a court of law. But this resolution continued to remain a mere assurance, as it was not acted upon. The resolution did not confer any right upon a civil servant in respect of his wrongful dismissal, since the Government could act independently of any enquiry, without assigning any reason by taking recourse to the ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’.
The existing service regulations, were mere directions lo the Government of the colonies by the Crown for their guidance, and did not confer any right upon the civil servants. This came to be reflected in the decision of the Privy Council in Shenten V .Smith. II held that the civil servants hold their office subject to the pleasure of the Crown and therefore, remedy need not be in the form of any law suit, but by way of an appeal of an official or political kind.
[1]Senton vs smith(1895) A.C 229at 234Dunn vs The Queen(1896) Q.B 116
[2]1960. Halsbury’s Law of England(3rd) London