This paper critically analyzes the Basic Structure Doctrine as the unamendable core of the Indian Constitution, with a focus on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Anjum Kadari and Another v. Union of India and Others. In this decision, the Court narrowed the doctrine’s application, emphasizing that the constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged solely on the grounds of breaching the Basic Structure. It clarified that such a violation must be demonstrably linked to a specific constitutional provision, thus reaffirming the limited scope of the doctrine in assessing ordinary legislation. The court noted further that these elementary principles, such as secularism, federalism, and democracy, as components of the Basic Structure, are not defined in the Constitution itself. To allow, therefore, statutes to be set aside on the grounds of these abstract generalisations would inject unpredictability into constitutional interpretation and judgment. This judgment particularly resonates with regard to the ambiguity and intricacy attending the Basic Structure Doctrine not being anchored to an explicit constitutional provision.
This paper traces the origin of the Basic Structure doctrine, its development in Indian Jurisprudence, comparative insights from other jurisdictions and how it came to be formed in the current structure despite most of the principles forming a part of it being undefined. This paper assesses the doctrine’s practical challenges and limitations by addressing critiques, including the potential for Judicial overreach, undemocratic implications and the intrinsic vagueness of these undefined constitutional principles. In conclusion, the paper asserts the indispensable nature of the Basic Structure doctrine despite the ongoing clamours about its validity and application in contemporary constitutional adjudication.
Keywords- Basic Structure, Judiciary, Parliament, constitutional amendment, ordinary law.
The Constitution embodies the will of the people and lays the foundation of civil society. As the supreme law of the land, it protects fundamental rights, outlines key political principles, and governs the structure and functioning of the state. It needs to evolve over time to address societal changes, and thus, the need arises for constitutional amendments. A static Constitution could hinder a nation’s progress, but provisions for amendments ensure that challenges can be addressed within constitutional boundaries.
Even though Parliament has the authority to amend the Constitution, this power can easily be used as a tool of dictatorship. India’s turbulent political history, characterized by repeated attempts by Parliament to bypass legal constraints make the Constitution pliable enough to impose its arbitrary will, created a necessity for imposing strict limitations on this amending power in order to ensure democratic principles and constitutional integrity.
The Basic Structure doctrine emerged as a judicial safeguard, placing limits on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. By asserting that the Constitution’s foundational principles cannot be altered, this doctrine has prevented arbitrary attempts by Parliament to undermine judicial review. Though this tussle between Parliament and the judiciary began in the 1970s, it continues to be a contentious issue today.
The question of whether the basic structure doctrine should be extended to ordinary laws has sparked significant debate among jurists and scholars. Traditionally, the doctrine was devised to limit the power of Parliament under Article 368[1] to ensure that constitutional amendments do not violate the core principles of the Constitution. The extension of this doctrine to ordinary laws, however, raises complex questions about the balance of power, the role of the judiciary, and the legislative process.
[1] The Constitution of India 1950, art. 368