Abstract
This article examines the intricate relationship between federalism and constitutionalism in facilitating power-sharing within multi-level governance systems. Federalism’s core purpose is to distribute authority across national and regional governments, which aids in accommodating diversity and preventing centralisation. Constitutionalism, through principles like the rule of law and separation of powers, provides a legal framework that constrains and structures this power distribution. This paper demonstrates how constitutional design and governance models shape power-sharing by exploring theoretical frameworks, models of federalism, and case studies from jurisdictions like the US, Germany, India, and Canada. Additionally, it addresses challenges inherent in multi-level governance, including fiscal federalism, regionalism, and intergovernmental conflicts. This analysis concludes that successful federal systems effectively balance local autonomy with national unity, responding to dynamic political, economic, and cultural factors.
Keywords: Federalism, Constitutionalism, Multi-Level Governance, Power Sharing, Rule of Law, Separation of Powers, Judicial Review, Fiscal Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, Regionalism, Subsidiarity, Comparative Analysis