ABSTRACT
This research examines predominant corporate governance models, analyzing structures and strategies utilized to balance interests among key stakeholders like shareholders, management, and the board of directors. Core aspects assessed across models include ownership concentration, board composition and effectiveness, executive compensation schemes, shareholder rights protection, transparency standards, and regulatory approaches. The analysis covers major models adopted globally, including the Anglo-American single- tiered board structure centered on shareholder primacy, the German two-tiered model encompassing codetermination, and the Japanese keiretsu cross-shareholding structure prioritizing long-term growth over immediate shareholder returns. Additionally, hybrid approaches are explored, along with implications of concentrated state or family ownership common internationally. By comprehensively evaluating leading models through a comparative law methodology, this research elucidates tradeoffs and situational appropriateness of structures. Analysis suggests unitary boards with diverse independent directors may enhance firm monitoring and accountability. However, codetermined and two- tiered models can enable broader stakeholder representation. Ownership patterns significantly impact applications, with family or state control necessitating tailored approaches regarding minority shareholder protections. In distilling key advantages and disadvantages of prevailing models, this study offers corporate board members, executives and policymakers guidance on tailoring governance based on ownership, control, regulatory environment and prioritization of shareholder, stakeholder or long-term interests. Analysis aims to inform choices on best practices for given contexts to balance corporate oversight with operational efficiency
Keywords- Corporate Governance, Shareholders, Board of Directors, Management, Transparency, Structures, Anglo American model, Indian model, German model