BAIL JURISPRUDENCE FOR JUVENILES: INTERPRETING “DEFEATING THE ENDS OF JUSTICE” – Shantanu Agnihotri
ABSTRACT
Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 establishes a compelling presumption in favour of bail of the child alleged to be in conflict with the law—even if the alleged offence is bailable or non-bailable. Bail can only be denied on three very specific grounds, one of which is when “defeat the ends of justice”. This expression is neither defined in the Act nor explained in the Rules but gives wide latitude of interpretation for Juvenile Justice Boards and High Courts. This paper looks at the phrase, legislative intent and judicial interpretation of that phrase. It is argued that ‘the ends of justice’ should only be interpreted in a narrow, concrete and proportional way, requiring specific and credible material evidence of a risk to the integrity of the proceedings, for example, that evidence might have been tampered with, that witnesses might be intimidated, that the evidence might be absconded or that the evidence might be the subject of repeated failures of compliance with directions of the judge. The paper also examines the interconnection between the rehabilitative rights of the child, the rights of the victims and the State’s interest in the right to a fair trial, and recommends structured safeguards to give a more consistent, transparent and rights-respecting approach to bail decisions.
Keywords: juvenile justice; bail; Juvenile Justice Board; defeating the ends of justice; child rights; fair trial.
- Introduction
A child alleged to be in conflict with the law is in a special position in the Indian criminal law system.[1] The general principle of the bail law has been reversed under JJ Act: firstly, the starting point is that a child who is apparently in conflict with the law “shall” be released on bail, with or without surety, or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or the care of a fit person;[2] secondly, it reflects the rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile justice law and the constitutional principles of treating children with dignity and care.[3]
The presumption is not conclusive. Section 12(1) permits denial of bail where there are reasonable grounds for believing that release would bring the child into association with a known criminal, expose the child to moral, physical or psychological danger, or defeat the ends of justice.[4] The third exception—“defeating the ends of justice”—is the most open-textured. The latter two exceptions are aimed primarily at risks to the child, while this one is about the integrity of the criminal process itself. It thus poses the most potential for conflict between the child’s rights to freedom and the State’s rights to a fair trial.[5]
The question of interpretation is not only doctrinal but also practical. Often Juvenile Justice Boards (“Boards”) are confronted with allegations relating to serious violence, sexual offences, organised crime, narcotics and offences against the State. If so, the pressure to deny bail may arise, due to the seriousness of the accusation. But the JJ Act deliberately distinguishes between seriousness of the offence and whether the child should be released with bail: the presumption of release is made simply for every serious offence if “defeating the ends of justice” were treated as a catch-all for all serious allegations.[6] On the other hand, if the phrase were interpreted so strictly that there was no material circumstance that would ever warrant detention, then it would not serve to protect the victims or witnesses, or the fairness of trial.[7]
In this paper I propose a middle ground. The exception of defeating the ends of justice is a fact specific exception, and carries with it the requirement for concrete and credible material which shows that release would cause a “substantial and demonstrable risk of the administration of justice”. The Board shall determine the specific risk, link it to credible material, evaluate less restrictive options and document in writing. The gravity of the offence is of relevance only if it is relevant to a legally recognised risk and not as an alternative to it.[8]
In Part II, the statutory framework is explored. Part III explains the meaning of “defeating the ends of justice.” The judicial approaches are analysed in Part IV. Burden, Evidence and Procedure are covered in Part V. Heinous crimes and age-related issues are discussed in Part VI. Part VII provides recommendations and Part VIII concludes.
[1] For the ordinary bail regime, see Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC), ss 436–439, replaced by Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (BNSS), ss 478, 480, 482 and 483.
[2] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 (JJ Act), s 12(1).
[3] Constitution of India 1950, arts 21, 39(e) and 39(f); JJ Act, s 3.
[4] JJ Act, s 12(1), proviso.
[5] JJ Act, s 12(1), proviso; Constitution of India 1950, art 21.
[6] JJ Act, s 12(1) (applying to a ‘bailable or non-bailable offence’); cf JJ Act, s 2(33) (defining ‘heinous offences’).
[7] JJ Act, s 12(1), proviso.
[8] JJ Act, s 12(1), proviso (the Board ‘shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision’).