This article examines the transformation of Indian federal governance within the framework of twenty-first-century constitutionalism and evaluates its constitutional implications. While the Indian federal structure has traditionally been characterised by a model of cooperative federalism grounded in institutional complementarity and shared responsibilities, recent governance practices indicate a gradual shift towards a more centralised and structurally asymmetrical federal arrangement. Adopting a doctrinal research methodology, the paper analyses constitutional provisions, landmark judicial decisions, and emerging institutional practices to assess the evolving relationship between the Union and the States. It argues that the centralisation of fiscal powers, the expanding discretionary role of Governors, and increasing legislative assertiveness by the Union have collectively altered the constitutional balance in favour of the Centre.
The article further contends that, although these developments do not amount to explicit constitutional violations, they exhibit characteristics associated with “coercive federalism.” It critically examines the judicial response to these transformations and highlights the absence of a coherent doctrinal framework capable of addressing contemporary challenges to Indian federalism. By situating the Indian experience within a comparative federal context, the paper advocates the articulation of clearer constitutional safeguards and institutional mechanisms to preserve the federal character of governance and strengthen the autonomy of the States within the constitutional framework.
KEYWORDS:Constitutional Governance, Cooperative Federalism, Coercive Federalism, Federalism, Judicial Review, Separation of Powers
INTRODUCTION
The basic principle of the Indian Constitutional scheme lies in federalism. It is a system where both the Union and the states share power. The Indian system is considered quasi-federal in contrast to other forms of federations.[1] Apart from the guarantee of state sovereignty, it is characterized by an equally strong centre. Over time, however, this rigid categorisation has given way to a more dynamic understanding of federalism, particularly through the emergence of the concept of cooperative federalism, which emphasises coordination, consultation, and sharedresponsibility in governance.[2]This interpretation of the problem owes much to judicial pronouncements. According to the Supreme Court of India in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, federalism is an integral part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution.[3] Rather than being just a mere bureaucratic set-up, it gets its respect from such an interpretation. In the recent landmark judgment of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, the Supreme Court once again stressed upon constitutional equilibrium and cooperative governance to achieve democratic responsibility.[4]Trends within the modern field of management indicate a marked change in the way that this federal system functions. Modern times are marked by an increasing boldness of the Union legislature, centralizing finance decisions, and the discretion of the governor. All of these trends point to a less predictable relationship between the States and Centre.[5] While none of these trends overturn the constitutionally established system, it does cause one to speculate if this structure indeed helps foster the cooperation recommended by the judiciary.As a means to understand this emerging trend, this post will look at whether India’s federal system is evolving into coercive federalism.
[1]H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th ed. 1996).
[2]Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
[3]S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
[4]State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501.
[5]Louise Tillin, Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).