ABSTRACT
Judicial review serves as a cornerstone of constitutional governance, ensuring that legislative and executive actions remain within the bounds of law and constitutional principles. This research undertakes a comparative analysis of judicial review in India, the United States, and the United Kingdom, highlighting the evolution, scope, and limitations of this doctrine in three distinct constitutional systems. In India, judicial review is an implicit but firmly established feature derived from Articles 13, 32, 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution, empowering courts to safeguard fundamental rights and uphold constitutional supremacy. In the United States, judicial review is rooted in the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison (1803) and reflects a strong form of constitutional supremacy with a well-defined separation of powers. In contrast, the United Kingdom follows the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, where judicial review is comparatively limited and primarily focused on ensuring legality, rationality, and procedural fairness rather than constitutional invalidation of primary legislation. The study examines how each jurisdiction balances judicial authority with democratic principles, and how constitutional design influences the intensity and scope of judicial intervention. It further explores contemporary challenges, including judicial activism, constitutional interpretation, and the evolving role of courts in democratic governance. The comparative approach provides deeper insights into how judicial review operates as both a legal safeguard and a constitutional constraint across different legal traditions.
Keywords: Judicial Review, Constitutional Law, India, United States, United Kingdom, Separation of Powers, Parliamentary Sovereigntyetc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Judicial review is the main tool which constitutional courts use to supervise public power and is seen by comparative public law as a means of seeing how different jurisdictions are committed to limited government, separation of powers, and rights protection. The Indian model is an explicitly designed constitution that makes the court’s review justiciable through “Article 13 of the Constitution of India”, “Article 32 of the Constitution of India” and “Article 226 of the Constitution of India”. On the other hand, the US system is grounded in “Article III of the U.S. Constitution” and the structural logic of constitutional supremacy, with the “Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution” completing the hierarchical picture. The United Kingdom still keeps parliamentary sovereignty but the modern stance has layers of rights conscious statutory constitutionalism most notably under the “Human Rights Act 1998” which gives the courts the power to interpret and assess legislation and public action in a manner that is in conformity with the rights of the Convention.[1]
A comparison of different systems discloses three different settlements: first, constitutional supremacy with strong strike down in India and the United States; second, legislative supremacy tempered by interpretation and remedies that respect Parliament in the United Kingdom. Judicial review changes in these three systems are a response to the demands of modern governance, ranging from complex regulation and national security to socio economic claims and digital privacy. The Indian case is still very important for comparative public law as it combines a written charter of rights with wide remedial powers, experimental remedies, and a rights federalism mix which is understandable to courts in other democracies. The American case is still at the center of global debates on separation of powers, federalism and standards for reviewing agency action. The British case is an example of parliamentary government being able to coexist with strong legal accountability through interpretation, declarations, and structured procedural control thus making possible a sophisticated balance between democratic choice and rights protection.
[1]Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine 142 (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1st edn., 2009).