Abstract
The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 is one of the most ambitious and controversial attempts to impose constitutional accountability on the Indian executive. The Bill mandates that the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and all Union and State Ministers demit office if they are detained for more than thirty days in connection with any offence punishable with imprisonment of five years or more. The stated objective of this amendment is to arrest the growing criminalisation of politics and restore public faith in the integrity of the executive branch. The hypothesis advanced in this paper is that, although normatively attractive and grounded in legitimate democratic concerns, the amendment is constitutionally precarious because it relies on “detention” as the trigger for disqualification a standard that is extremely vulnerable to political misuse in India’s existing institutional environment.
In recent years, several opposition leaders, including sitting Chief Ministers and senior ministers, have been detained for extended periods during investigations many of which have later been criticised by courts for weak evidence or procedural irregularities. Allegations of selective targeting through central investigative agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate and Central Bureau of Investigation have become routine in political discourse. Against this backdrop, a detention-based constitutional disqualification runs the risk of not cleansing political life, but instead enabling the ruling establishment whether at the Union or State level to destabilise rival governments or eliminate political adversaries.
This paper examines the historical foundations of ministerial responsibility in the Indian constitutional framework, analyses the structural and doctrinal implications of the amendment, and situates it within comparative democratic practices. The analysis highlights that the amendment, in its present form, undermines due process, distorts separation of powers, threatens federal stability, and may disproportionately harm the opposition while leaving ruling party leaders who are less likely to be arrested relatively insulated. While the objective of ethical governance is legitimate and urgent, the mechanism adopted is constitutionally imbalanced and demands substantial safeguards to prevent the institutionalisation of vendetta politics.
Keywords: ministerial accountability, criminalisation of politics, constitutional morality, federalism, due process.
I. Introduction
The foundation of India’s parliamentary democracy lies in the principle of responsible government, under which the political executive remains accountable to the legislature and ultimately to the electorate. Ministers, including the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers, are entrusted with significant constitutional authority, and their continued legitimacy depends upon public trust and adherence to constitutional norms. The Constituent Assembly deliberately adopted the Westminster model of collective and individual ministerial responsibility, expecting that conventions and political morality would regulate ministerial conduct[1].
However, India’s democratic experience has been marred by the persistent problem of criminalisation of politics. A substantial proportion of elected representatives face pending criminal cases, including for serious offences, a fact documented by the Election Commission and independent organisations[2]. The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed deep concern that the presence of individuals with questionable backgrounds in the executive and legislature erodes public confidence in governance and weakens democratic institutions[3].
The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 is positioned as a bold corrective. By mandating resignation upon thirty days of detention, the Bill seeks to strengthen ethical governance and prevent individuals facing serious allegations from exercising executive authority. On its face, this is a reasonable response to public expectations of integrity in public office. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has underscored that while legal disqualification is limited, constitutional morality dictates that persons with serious criminal allegations should not be appointed as ministers[4].
Yet, the gap between constitutional morality and enforceable constitutional mechanisms is wide. Detention, particularly pre-trial or under special statutes, has little correlation with guilt. Indian courts have repeatedly highlighted misuse[5] of arrest and the excessive resort to pre-trial detention[6]. Similarly, the Supreme Court has cautioned against procedural unfairness in detentions arising under stringent laws such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA)[7].
The political context intensifies the constitutional stakes. Opposition leaders have been arrested and detained for prolonged durations, often in high-profile cases involving allegations of corruption or money laundering. In some such matters, subsequent judicial review has raised concerns about weak evidence, investigative delay, or questionable procedural choices by enforcement agencies[8]. Simultaneously, empirical studies and journalistic analyses have pointed out that a disproportionate number of high-profile arrests by central agencies involve opposition figures, a pattern that risks undermining the perception of neutrality in law enforcement[9].
When the constitutional consequence of detention becomes removal from ministerial office, detention ceases to be a neutral procedural step and becomes a political event with profound implications. In such circumstances, a constitutional amendment relying on detention risks weaponising the criminal process. A Chief Minister or key minister from an opposition-ruled State could be detained, legitimately or otherwise, and thus compelled to resign, destabilising an elected government and altering the democratic landscape.
This paper, therefore, approaches the 130th Amendment not merely as a reformist initiative but as a constitutional turning point that demands careful examination. The objective of purifying politics is laudable and necessary, but the method must withstand constitutional scrutiny and political reality.
[1] Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 30 July 1949 (Dr. B.R. Ambedkar)
[2] Association for Democratic Reforms, “Criminal Cases Against MPs/MLAs” (2023); Law Commission of India, 244th Report (2014)
[3] Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 224
[4] Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1
[5] Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273
[6] Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427
[7] Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1
[8] V. Senthil Balaji v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 2013
[9] NCRB, “Crime in India” (2022); Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, Report on “Law Enforcement and Political Neutrality” (2021)