THE NATURE, FACTS AND PROGRESSION OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 by - NEELAKSHI, SHREYA SINGH
This paper deals with the rule of contempt and why there is skepticism of the principle of criminal contempt. One of the most powerful statues made so far is the Contempt of Court. It also deals with an advocate’s ethical behavior towards the court and should regard the subjective decision as to what constitutes criminal contempt in the legal profession as a breach of ethics. Those held in contempt may include parties to a proceeding, counsel, witnesses, jurors, persons in or around a proceeding, and the court itself officers or employees. Other than the general law of contempt, this paper further discusses the explanation behind the development of this separate act as the ordinary judicial procedure is so sluggish that it can obstruct the course of justice. Further the paper focuses on nature, limitations & the newly emerging trends in Contempt.
KEYWORDS: CONTEMPT OF COURTS, CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, CONTEMNOR, REASONABLE RESTRICTION, AUTHORITY OF COURT
“The principal aim of the jurisdiction is to protect the dignity of the court and the due administration of justice”.2
The Constitution of India is made by “we the people and sovereign republic of India”. Preamble of the constitution speaks of our basic fundamental rights that are judicial, economical, social and political growth. Social justice and equality before law is a thing of masses (lower and middle class). They can easily relate with the laws and orders made, higher classes is often sensitive to these kinds of terms and feels that is for their humiliation. The Contempt of Court is one of the most powerful statues made so far. It defines and limits the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. It extends from restricting someone’s liberty to scandalize the court to punishing them from disobeying any order, writ or jurisdiction. It focuses on matter concerning with fair administration of justice and protecting the dignity of an order or a jurisdiction or a decree or be it a court. This act of protecting the dignity and authority of judicial procedure may be called as “The Contempt of Court Act, 1971” and it extends to whole of India. It is also a constitutional power vested with the Supreme Court of India. Firstly, Article 1293 states that “The Supreme Court shall be a Court of record and have all the powers of such a court including the powers to contempt of itself”4. Secondly, Article 142 (2) states “Subject to the provision of any law made in this behalf of Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respect the whole of the territory of India, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself”5. Among these two provisions, the Court further clarified that its primary source of contempt power is under Article 129, as the power under 142 is qualified by any law the Parliament makes.6
THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF THE LAW FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT IN INDIA
The roots of Contempt of Court can be traced way back to when there was no codified law prior to 1926. This particular phrase “Contempt of Court” has been in use in English law more likely in the 18th century. The doctrine of contempt in English civil law is definitely a thin one but with a detailed history to study. Initially, to punish the contempt of their own king were set in the first half of 12th century which was mentioned in the laws of King Henry I in England. Earlier in the 13th century, John Charles Fox was of the view that there is no indication of procedure of trial in cases related to Contempt of Court other than few civil cases. As soon as the 14th century begun, many statues were passed giving Supreme Court the power to act against the officers of the Court and juries too. So, by the middle of the Seventeenth Century the King’s Bench was proceeding summarily against its Officers.7 History of Contempt of Court in India can be traced back to pre-independence when East India Company took over the power on territories of India. The English laws were applied to the Chartered High Courts. When the High Courts were constituted by letter Patent, English Common law was evoked. As regards the power to punish for contempt of subordinate Courts, there was a different opinion amongst the High Courts. While it was held that High Court’s inherent power to punish for contempt did not extend to contempt committed against a subordinate Court,8 the contrary view of the same was taken by the Madras, Bombay and Allahabad High Courts.9
While leaving the intact of High Court to punish for its own contempt, a resolution was passed in the House of Commons in the year 1906 that the jurisdictions which are passed by judges are arbitrary. Many bills were passed so far to solve this problem in the years 1883, 1892, 1894, 1896 and so on but none was sufficient. Then came, Contempt of Court Act, 1926 which was passed with the view to remove the controversy regarding to the powers of High Courts to punish Subordinate Courts. Later, this law was replaced by Contempt of Court Act, 1952 because the laws made were unsatisfactory and needed changes in the view of Supreme Court. Therefore, in 1969, government brought a bill to consolidate and amend the law, but after examination it was found that whole of the provision requires necessary changes. With the same objective, a committee was setup, with Sri Sanyal (Additional Solicitor General) as its chairman.10 Sanyal Committee submitted a report with draft on Contempt of Court Act, 1963 harmonizing the individual’s Freedom of Speech and Expression.11 The bill was eventually passed as the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 which is said to be more exhaustive than that of 1952.12
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF 1971
In case, N Ram & Ors vs. Union of India,13 a petition was filed by Hindu’s former editor N. Ram, Senior Advocate Prashant Bhushan and former Union Minister Arun Shourie, challenging the constitutionality of Section 2(c) of this act, which deals with offence of criminal contempt on the ground of “scandalizing the court or lowering the dignity of the court”. They said that there is violation of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950 as Section 2(c) imposes a limit on Article 19(2) and that limitation is too broad. The petitioners are of the view that any limit imposed on Article 19(2) should be narrow one and if it is broad, it is unconstitutional. Further, they argue that the subsection criminalize the offence which has no relation in judicial proceedings. Additionally, they argue that it does not require some ‘proximate and tangible’ harm to be likely in order for speech to be criminal.14 It has been argued in the petition that it is highly subjective which gives different readings in different applications which shows arbitrariness in decisions. “Vague laws may trap the innocent without warning” and “Manifest arbitrariness a ground to hold S.2(c) Unconstitutional” are the sentences which were used in their petition referring to the cases like Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab,15ShayaraBano vs. Union of India16 and NavtejJohar vs. Union of India.17
Since the definition in Clause (c) of Section 2 is exhaustive, no act would be held to constitute a contempt of court if it does not fall under it. Thus, nothing can be criminal contempt unless there is publication or doing of an act which falls under this subsection. Secondly, the act may differ in different cases but once the offending matter constitutes contempt against administration of justice, it matters little that against whom the contempt is made.18 Also, this act cannot be challenged for the violation of Article 14 on the ground that Section 15 creates differences between private citizens and Advocate-General because Advocate-General Stand as class that prevent the dignity of the Court.19 Contempt of Court is a specific and reasonable restriction within the preview of Article 19(2). Since the Act of 1971 is much more improved as regards procedural safeguards than pre-1971 law, the laws here are not violated.20
WHAT IS CONTEMPT OF COURT?
In the case, L.R. vs. Das Gupta,21 it was held that Legislature finds it unnecessary to define this act in a term as it has already ascribed a meaning by judicial pronouncements of English and Indian Courts. It can be simply referred as “contempt” means an offence of being disobedient and disrespectful and that too towards court. Contempt can essentially be of two kinds:22
1.Being disrespectful and rude to the judge or an attorney or subsequently causing any form of a disturbance in the courtroom particularly even after being warned by the
2. Willfully failing or refusing to obey an order given by the court such as failure to pay alimony or child
NATURE OF A PROCEEDING IN CONTEMPT
The basic nature of the contempt of court is ensuring administration of justice. The reason behind the creation of this act separately other than the general law is that the ordinary criminal process is so slow that it may hamper the course of justice. Contempt of Court is basically divided into civil contempt and criminal contempt based on the content of the contempt under section 2 of this act.
According to section 2(b), “civil disobedience” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to court.23 The ground of punishment for civil disobedience is as same as criminal contempt that it is in public interest that the orders of the court are disregarded.24 It was held in the case “Baradakanta vs. Bhimsen”25 by the Supreme Court of India that the jurisdiction of this act is completely based on the fact that the authority and administration of justice should be protected from disobedience. Also, it has been made clear that a administrative tribunal, subject to the jurisdiction under Article 22726 cannot refuse to follow any order or decision made by High Court even if the appeal is being made against such decision in Supreme Court. Since the image of majesty cannot be distorted in the eyes of people, the dignity of the courts need to be maintained. No system of jurisdiction permits the scandalizing or tolerates the unwanted and uncalled behavior of someone towards the court. Supreme Court in the case named Delhi
Development Authority v. Skipper construction27 held that if someone does any willful disobedience to the orders of court or abstain to do any act decided by the court, will be considered doing civil contempt and that too will be accepted corrected until proved otherwise. However, a fair criticism of judicial order, an honest case commentary, innocent publication and reasonable Article distribution does not amount to Contempt of Court.
Criminal Contempt which is second nature of Contempt of Courts defined in Section 2(c) – “criminal contempt means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
- Scandalize or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
- Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, due course of any judicial proceeding; or
- Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other
The word publication in this section has very wide meaning. In Brahma Prakash’s case,28 the Supreme Court held that “the question of publication in the technical sense in which it is relevant in a libel action may be inappropriate to the law of contempt”, though the extend of publicity to decide is totally on the court in determining that whether the statement made is with bona-fide intention or was made intentionally. Also, if there is no publication, there is no court of contempt committed.
Secondly, it is immaterial that in which form statement is made. Contempt of Court is committed if the words fall within the ambit of sub clause (i)-(iii) that is a) spoken words;29 b) written words, e.g. a news paper Article;30 c) signs; d) visible representation; e) any other form of representation; f) doing any act, having such effect; g) making false allegations on oath, In an affidavit;31 h) sending a telegram to the CJI.32 Thirdly, when we talk about so far as scandalisation of the Court is concerned in India, it has become obsolete33 which should be only used when exercising proper administration of law and justice. In case, Tyagi vs. Gupta34 a newspaper editorial allege that the Court in our country do not act on consideration of justice but are influenced by the lure of wealth, wine and women. The publisher as well as writer both was held liable for this contemptuous remark. Scandalisation of the judiciary as whole is not permitted in any case even if the statement made is willful and is made by dignitary such as speaker of the State Legislature. Thus, any criticism which tends to bring into ridicule and contempt the administration of justice is contempt.35
Also, prejudice or interference with any court proceedings or administration of justice would amount to Contempt of Court. Any interference even by the media or newspaper is not considered proper especially in the pending cases. When it comes to cases held in camera, it is completely violation of Contempt of Court if someone tries to make it public and violate someone’s right to privacy and in such cases intention and motive of the publisher is irrelevant.
PUNISHMENT UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT
Punishment for contempt is necessary part of this act which shouldn’t be performed lightly but should be exercised in a way that upholds the dignity of the court.36 Section 12 of the Contempt of Court codifies the punishment for contempt is imprisonment, civil detention and fine. No court of justice has power to give a decision of punishment other then these three under common law or otherwise. Section 12 makes it clear that no person can be punished in the absence of clear finding that he is ‘guilty’ as merely holding that the conduct of the alleged contemnor was contumacious would not be enough.37 Contempt Proceedings are quasi-criminal and being it a special jurisdiction, it is to be used cautiously and exercised sparingly to uphold dignity of Court and majesty of law.38 In quasi-criminal cases, the standard of proof has to be proved beyond reasonable doubts. Where there can be two interpretations regarding the applicability of this act; one in favour of contemnor and one against him, the contemnor would be in most of the cases entitled for benefit of doubt.39
LIMITATIONS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
Section 20 of Contempt of Court Act defines the scope of proceedings for contempt. It prescribes a period of limitation for initiating a proceeding for contempt. This bar will be applicable not to cases on motion reference, but also where Court acts suomoto40. Henceforth, no notification can be given to the contemnor, regardless, in the event that one year has, by date, lapsed from the date on which hatred is affirmed to have been submitted. Furthermore, the beginning stage of constraint is date of the demonstration by which the supposed hatred was submitted, independent of the date of information on the complainant of that scorn. There is no application of application of Section 20 where the act of not complying with the Court’s order is a continuing wrong.41 In the matter of limitation for contempt, Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of Court. It does not provide limitation in the sense understood in Limitation Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply.42
SUO MOTO JURISDICTION
Section 15 talks about suomoto locale of the High Court just in issues of criminal scorn it has been held that under the pre-1971 law, the Court had purview to continue suomoto even if there should arise an occurrence of common disdain, and that this ward has not been removed by anything in the current Act.43 Further, when Court proceeds in a case of civil contempt, whether on motion or suomoto, there is no obligation to follow any particular form of procedure (unless so prescribed by the Rules), but rules of natural justice should be compiled with, by giving the alleged contemnor, an opportunity of defending himself.44
In M/s. Gokul Dairy case,45 the purview to engage, hear and choose Contempt matters has been obviously characterized and the strategy set down is that it would be inside the forces of the central equity, in which the authoritative control of the High Court vests, to allot the Contempt of Court locale to some Court. Such procedural standards were set down in Prof. Y.C. Simhadari’s case,46 wherein it was additionally emphasized that Contempt Jurisdiction is a free locale of unique nature, regardless of whether exuding from the Contempt of Court Act or under Article 215 of the Indian Constitution, and the force under the Contempt of Court Act couldn’t be practiced except if presented upon a solitary adjudicator by the Chief Justice. Such a power is inherent in High Court and cannot be curtailed or abridged by Contempt of Court or High Court Rules.47
NEWLY EMERGING TRENDS
In past few years there has been trend going on which shows increase in application of cases against “Oligarchs” for doing Contempt of Court. Today, in India, the custodians of power are disobeying, praying to the people’s court. This irony has flashed a rare spotlight on the working of courts.48 Over a century back, Lord Morris while conveying the judgment of the legal advisory group in Mac Leod vs. St. Aubyn49, noticed, “Committals for disdain by embarrassing the court itself have gotten outdated in this nation. Courts are fulfilled to leave to general assessment assaults or remarks disdainful or outrageous to them.”
In a comparable vein, Lord Denning in 1968 in Regina vs. Commissioner of Police,50 noticed, “Let me state immediately that we won’t ever utilize this locale as a way to maintain our own poise. That should lay on surer establishments. Nor will we use it to smother the individuals who denounce us. We don’t fear analysis, nor do we disdain it. For there is something undeniably more significant in question. It is no not as much as the right to speak freely of discourse itself.” Closer home, Chief Justice Gajendragadkar continuing in the rich liberal custom, while heading a seven-judge seat of the zenith court in a 1964 body of evidence forewarned against continuous or unpredictable utilization of the influence of hatred and noticed, “Insightful Judges always remember that that the most ideal approach to support the pride and status of their office is to merit regard from people in general everywhere by the nature of their decisions, the dauntlessness, decency and objectivity of their methodology and by the limitation, nobility and etiquette which they see in their legal lead.” The activity of disdain power by courts lately should be set in the structure outlined out by Morris, Denning and Gajendragadkar.
Leave aside more mind boggling matters, inspecting from first standards the way of activity of disdain power, even in the evidently away from of the condemning to detainment of Nand Lal 50Regina vs. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, CA 1968.
Balwani,51 who purportedly heaved a shoe towards the court, raises questions. The occurrence happened on the morning of February 26, 1999 in the summit court. By evening, a similar seat indicted Balwani for scorn and condemned him to four months detainment.
The privilege to a free council, security against self-implication, the prerequisite of aim or mens rea in criminal law and the privilege to a legitimate specialist are a portion of the rules that should be borne as a main priority in the activity of criminal hatred purview. For Balwani’s situation, as opposed to eluding the scorn matter to some other seat, a similar seat at which the shoe was supposedly tossed took insight without even a “chilling” period, abusing the privilege to an autonomous court. The privilege of security against self-implication and the privilege to a lawful expert seem to have been abused, and the issue of the expectation or mensrea was not gone into by the court.
Ruler Goff in Regina vs. Gough52 saw that in the activity of scorn ward, “It is indispensably essential to try not to give the feeling that the appointed authority is one-sided or that the choice has been provoked by close to home ill will.” Viewed from the stance of protections, fused in Article 653 the pattern is to elude the issue to a seat other than the one preceding whom the hatred was submitted. This is an acknowledgment that it is conceivable that the adjudicator won’t have seen the whole occurrence of which the grievance is made, especially if the demonstration of scorn is a momentary and single one, as seems, by all accounts, to be the situation in the shoe-tossing matter. Accordingly, before truth can be adequately settled it could be important to have a decent arrangement of proof from onlookers, some of whom may have had an alternate impression from that of the adjudicator.
Indeed, even where a similar seat hears the issue, the attractive quality of a “chilling” period between the episode and the scorn hearing has been focused. The Phillimore Committee, Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court stressed that the “broad” hatred forces should just be worked out, “without … being affected by the warmth or irritation existing apart from everything else”.
IS THE TIME CHANGING?
Normal practices concerning worthy limitations on freedom, the estimation of free discourse in a popular government change after some time and must be taken into awareness. In 1972,
E.M.S. Namboodripad, at that point boss priest of Kerala, was pulled up for hatred for expressing that judges are prey to the inclinations of their group and are weighted against the abused laborers and regular workers. The guard that the remarks comprised reasonable and sensible analysis of the legal framework and were ensured by the option to free discourse was dismissed by the Supreme Court. In 1987, the law serve P. Shiv Shankar alluded to the tip top foundation of the adjudicators in a discourse at the Bar Council of Hyderabad and pronounced, “Mahadhipatis like Keshavananda and Zamindars like Golaknath evoked a thoughtful harmony no place in the entire nation aside from the Supreme Court of India. Furthermore, the bank magnates, the delegates of the elitist culture of this nation, capably upheld by industrialists, the recipients of freedom, got higher pay by the mediation of the Supreme Court in Cooper case. Against social components for example FERA violators, lady of the hour burners and an entire swarm of traditionalists have discovered their asylum in the Supreme Court”.
The zenith court in P.N. Duda vs. P. Shiv Shankar,54 took the view that Shiv Shankar had inspected the class arrangement of the Supreme Court. His view that the class arrangement of any instrument shows its inclination, its biases didn’t add up to scorn. Alluding to the EMS case, the Court saw that, “times and climes have changed over the most recent twenty years”. The view taken by the summit court in the Arundhati Roy case55 in 2002 is as a conspicuous difference to the liberal viewpoint reflected in the P.N. Duda case. After the judgment in the Narmada Bachao Andolan case in 2000, there was a dharna fighting the larger part judgment outside the Supreme Court on 30-12-2000. This prompted appeal being documented by J.R. Parashar and four different promoters against Advocate Prashant Bhushan, Narmada Bachao pioneer Medha Patkar and author Arundhati Roy for scorn of court. Notification were given on a somewhat pitifully drafted appeal which in negation of the Supreme Court Rules neither determined the addresses of the applicants nor the respondents and was without essential assent from either the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General. The Supreme Court gave notification to Bhushan, Patkar and Roy. The appeal was in the end excused by the Court.
508, RLW 2002 (3) SC 398, 2001 (8) SALE 316 A, (2002) 3 SCC 343, 2002 2 SCR 213, 2002 (1) UJ 491 SC.
Be that as it may, the court started suomoto scorn procedures against Arundhati Roy for three sections in the sworn statement documented in the Parashar case.56 The offensive passages are unexpected with regards to the exemption of Shiv Shankar in the Duda case and the move in demeanor of the Supreme Court. The one section which can be considered the most “hostile” in the Roy affirmation is replicated beneath for examination with the hard hitting Shiv Shankar discourse. “It demonstrates a disturbing tendency with respect to the Court to quiet analysis and gag contradicts, to hassle and threaten the individuals who can’t help contradicting it. By engaging a request dependent on a FIR that even a neighborhood police headquarters doesn’t decide to follow up on, the Supreme Court is doing its own standing and believability extensive mischief.”
The Supreme Court recognized the P.N. Duda case on the probable thinking that the analysis of the legal framework was made by P. Shiv Shankar, an individual who himself had been an appointed authority of the high court, was a pastor and had made examinations about the framework and communicated his assessment, while Arundhati Roy didn’t profess to have any uncommon information on law and the working of the legal executive and just professed to be an essayist of notoriety. The judgment held that the advantage which was accessible to P. Shiv Shankar was not accessible to Arundhati Roy and indicted her for hatred of court, forcing a sentence of one day detainment and a fine of Rs. 2000.
The current meaning of criminal scorn in India under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 utilizations phrases like “embarrasses or will in general outrage or brings or tends down to bring down the authority of any court’ and ‘meddles or will in general meddle with the organization of equity”. These articulations are intrinsically dubious and leave a ton of degree for mediation, reliant on the assessments, inclinations and the feelings evoked in the individual pass judgment and can prompt outlandish limitations on right to speak freely. With regards to the need to carefully characterize laws which remove the significant right to freedom, the Phillimore Committee in the United Kingdom suggested that the wrongdoing of outraging the court ought to be supplanted by another and carefully characterized criminal offense. The offense ought to be so comprised to remember the part of goal to weaken certainty for the organization of equity and protection ought to be accessible, if the protector could demonstrate that what he said was valid as well as that that the distribution as such was for the public advantage. Maybe the worldview of an almighty legal executive sending down electrical discharges fury on a groveling people should be saved and the arising complex issues including free discourse, limitation on freedom, truth as guard and incorporation of mensrea, should be bantered in the field of criminal scorn law in India.
This carries us to an end that anything that hinders or abridges the opportunity of cutoff points of any legal continuing or any lead that will in general bring the organization and authority of law into dismissal or disregard or to meddle with or even bias gatherings to their observers during suit that comprises of words expressed or composed that block certain organization of equity or distributing words which will in general bring the organization of equity into disdain, to bias the reasonable preliminary of any issue or cause would add up to be the subject of criminal or common procedures. So, hatred can be supposed to be a demonstration or exclusion that meddles or will in general meddle in the organization of equity. To establish scorn, it isn’t vital for there to be a real obstruction in the organization of equity. On the off chance that the entertainers griped of or even will in general meddle or if there is an endeavor to meddle in the organization of equity that might be taken as scorn.
1 Students of Lloyd Law College, Greater Noida
3Constitution of India, 1950.
4 Constitution of India, 1950, Article 129- “Supreme Court o be a Court of record”.
5 Constitution of India, 1950, Article 142(2).
7Styles Practical Registrar, 1657.
8L.R. vs. MotiLal, AIR 1914 Cal 69.
9Torburn v. Venkata, (1900) 10 MLJ 316; Gandhi, in re, AIR 1920 Bom 175; Abdul Hasan, in re; AIR 1926 All 623.
10Ministry of Law no. F 49/61- Adm. I, dated 29-7-1961.
11Article 19, Constitution of India, 1950.
12Prabhakar v. Sadanand, (1975) Cr LJ 531 (para 8) (Bom).
13 W.P. No. 5129 of 2012
15 1961 AIR 1787, 1962 SCR (2) 395
16 Petition (c) No. 118 of 2016
17 Criminal No. 76 of 2016
18Jugal Kishore vs. Sitamarbhi Co-op Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1494.
19Janardhan vs. Chakarvarty, (1975) Cr LJ 164 (paras 6-7).
20Law of the Press – Durga Das Basu, page 645, 5th edition.
21 1955 AIR 363, 1955 SCR
23Section 2, Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
24Seaward vs. Paterson, (1987) 1 Ch. 545.
25 AIR 1972 SC 2466 (PARAS 11-12).
26 Article 227 – Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court, Constitution of India, 1950.
27(1993) 3 SCC 507.
28Brahma Prakash vs. State of U.P., (1953) SCR 1196 (1183).
29Cf. Prabhakar vs. Sadanand, (1975) Cr LJ 531 (Bom).
30Cf. A.G. vs. English, (1982) 2 All ER 903 (918) HL.
31 Murray & Co. vs. Ashok Kr. Nevatia, (2000) 2 SCC 367: AIR 2000 SC 833 : 2000 Cr LJ 1394.
32 S.K. Sundarram, In re, (2001) 2 SCC 171 : AIR 2001 SC 2374.
33PersectivePublicaion vs. State of Maharasthra, AAR 1971 SC 221 (para 17).
34(1974) Cr LJ 428 (para 4) (All).
35Pritam vs. H.C., AIR 1992 SC 904 (para 60).
36State of U.P. vs. Ashok Saxena, 1998(2) RCR (Crl) 34 (SC).
37Hargovind vs. Verma , AIR 1977 SC 1334.
38State of U.P. vs. Kamal Narain Singh, 2000 Cr LJ 2805 (All).
39Mritunjay Das vs. SayedHasipurRahaman, AIR 2001 SC 1293.
40Venkatarmanappa vs. Naikar, AIR 1978 Knt 57.
41Ganpat vs. Kalu, AIR 1989 SC 2085 (para 5).
42 Om PrakashJaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal, AIR 2000 SC 1136.
43Yeganarayaniah, in the matter of, AIR 1974 Mad 313 (paras 10-11).In the matter of M. balakrishnan& another, 2000 CrLJ 3446 (Mad).
44Yeganarayaniah, in the matter of, AIR 1974 Mad 313 (paras 10-11).
45Gokul Dairy vs. State of U.P., 2002 All LJ 596 (DB).
46Prof. Y.C. Simhadari, Vice Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi v. DeenBandhuPathak, (2001) 3 up LBEC 2373.
47Verma vs. Hargovind, AIR 1975 All 52 (para 11).
49Mcleod vs. St. Aubyn(St. Vincent),  AC 549.
51 In Re: Mr. Nand Lal Balwani vs. In Re: Mr. Nand Lal Balwani, Contempt Petition (civil) 0 of 1999.
52 Regina vs. Gough (Robert): HL 1993.
53European Convention on Human Rights.
54P.N. Duda vs. V.P. Shiv Shankar & Others, 1988 AIR 1208, 1988 SCR (3) 547.
55 In Re: Arundhati Roy vs. Unknown, AIR 2002 SC 1375, 2002(1) BLJR 811, 2002 CriLJ 1792, JT 2002 (2) SC
56 Nikhil Parasar vs. The State Govt. Nct of Delhi, 2010.